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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
~IlLES 1\IIURRAY S}fiTH, 
Plaintiff and Appella.nt, 
vs. 
PHYLLIS D. SMITH, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
·civil No. 
8004 
A.PPEAL FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH. 
HONORABLE MARTIN M. LARSON, JUDGE. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
rrhis is an appeal fro1n a ruling by the District 
Court of the Third Judicial District, Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, giving the defendant in the action sole 
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care, custody and control of a minor child of the age of 
four years upon hearing together of petitions by both 
parties to modify the original divorce decree 'vith respect 
to custody of the child. 
The parties hereto were divorced by entry of an 
interlocutory decree of divorce by the Third District 
Court in and for the County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, 
on the 4th day of June, 1951, after three years of nlar-
riage. The decree of divorce among other things set up 
a split custody arrangement, each parent to have the 
child for alternate six Inonth periods, the father's 
(plaintiff) first term commencing on granting of the 
divorce ··and running to December 4, 1951, when the 
n1other 's (de£ en dan t) term "\\ras to begin. ( Rec. 1-2) 
The minor was 28 months of age at the time of the 
divorce and 4 years and 1 month old at the tin1e of the 
hearing on the petitions to modify. 
Said minor has resided with the plaintiff and been 
in his continuous custody and control since the date of 
the divorce (Tr. 8). The mother having failed to a~~Prt 
her right to custody of the child at her first period of 
custody as she thought it in the best interests of tlu) 
child to let it remain in the custody of the father, undt·r 
the care of the father's mother, anrl because she \\·a~ 
in c·aiifornia on a trip when the custody period began. 
(Tr. 32) When her second custody period began (Dee. i-, 
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1952), defendant \vas again in California residing with 
her ne'v husband and had Inade a tentative trade of 
custody periods with the plaintiff. ('Tr. 24-25 and 32) 
Both parties haYe ren1arried since the divorce action. 
The Plaintiff to one Betta Lanee Smith on Septem~er 
12, 1952, and the child has been residing with the plain-
tiff and his new "rife since that time. ( Tr. 3-5) The 
defendant on July 6, 1952, to one Steve Trask (Tr. 23-24). 
This marriage making the second for the Plaintiff, the 
first ending in the divorce action for "rhich 1nodification 
is sought. Defendant is married for the third time, the 
previous two having ended in divorce (Tr. 35). Plain-
tiff's present 'vife has had one previous marriage with 
no children, her husband now deceased (Tr. 13). Defend-
ant's present husband has had one previous marriage 
ending in divorce, with one minor child now 10 years old 
which Mr. Trask has not seen in yeaTs nor helped to 
support (Tr. 47-48). 
The plaintiff is an employee of seven continuous 
years with The Mountain Fuel Supply Company in Salt 
Lake City, earns $240.00 per month, and lives with his 
wife and child at 1729 South 9th East Street in Salt 
Lake City, in a duplex (Tr. 15-16) which is plaintiff's 
permanent residence. Plaintiff habitually spends several 
hours each day 'vith the child (Tr. 4 and 15 ). The plain-
tiff's present wife has no further responsibilities than 
c·aring for the home and the child (Tr. 16), she professes 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4 
a love for the child, has cared for him for the entire 
period since her n1arriage, and has set up a trust fund 
for his advance education (Tr. 15-16). 
The defendant now lives with her husband at 2344 
State Street in San Diego, California, in another woman's 
home with said other woman and her two children, ages 
7 and 10 years. Defendant by agreement takes care of 
the home and is responsible for the other children while 
their n1other is at work (Tr. 46-47). 
Defendant's husband is a roofer who in order to 
follo"\v his trade finds it necessary to make two interstate 
moves, both during the normal school year, working in 
Utah during the clement weather and in California dur-
ing winter ( Tr. 42-46). 
Defendant and her husband contemplate returning- to 
Salt Lake in May, but have n1ade no definite arrange-
ments for lodging or employment upon return (Tr. 30-31 
and 45). 
Defe~dant and her husband have no arrangement:-; 
to bring the child into the home they now share in San 
Diego ( Tr. 49-50). 
Defendant visited the child on week endH \\'hile 
working, and three to four times per "\\reek after her llHlr· 
riage prior to leaving for San Diego in N ove1nber, 1952. 
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Defendant's testi1nonv and the testin1uny of Bet tv 
.. .... .} 
1\tfcKendrick and Gladys La \Ton McKendrick shovv the 
plaintiff to haYe been seen on several occasions "'vhen he 
had been drinking· since the time of the divorce. Defend-
ant admitted on cross examination that she was also 
drinking on the occasions she testified as to the ilnbibing 
of the plaintiff. 
Defendant returned from San Diego on a visit in 
January of 1953. On or about February 9, 1953, plaintiff 
told defendant he vYas going to try to get permanent 
custody of the child. Defendant asserted her right to 
custody under the decree of divorce. Plaintiff filed on 
February 9, 1953, a petition to modify the divorce decree 
(Rec. 3-5). Defendant filed her Petition to Modify the 
Divorce Decree on February 13, 1953 (Rec. 8-12); both 
petitions were heard together. The Court awarded cus-
tody to the defendant (Rec. 82-83). Plaintiff moved for 
a rehearing and for amendment of Findings of Facts 
(Rec. 84-86). Such motions were denied (Rec. 88). Plain-
tiff appeals. 
POINT NO. I 
THAT THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUP-
PORT THE FINDING OF FACT OF THE COURT THAT: 
UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES NOW PREVAILING, 
WHICH CIRCUMSTANCES ARE SUBSTANTIALLY 
CHANGED FROM Tl1E CIRCUMSTANCES PREVAILING 
WHEN THE O·RIGINAL DECREE OF DIVORCE WAS 
GRANTED TO THE DEFENDANT HEREIN, IT IS IN THE 
BEST INTERESTS OF THE MINOR CHILD THAT HIS 
CARE, CUSTODY AND CONTROL BE AWARDED TO THE 
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DEFENDANT, RESERVING TO THE PLAINTIFF THE 
RIGHT TO VISIT SAID MINOR CHILD AT REASONABLE 
TIMES AND PLACES. 
It is the plaintiff and appellant's contention that the 
evidence is insufficient to support the findings of fact 
in any way so far as those findings show the best inter-
est of the minor, child to be served by granting· the care, 
custody and co11:trol of said child to the mother (the 
defendant and respondent herein). A review of the 
evidence herein as is in the power of the reviewing court 
as pointed out in Sampsell v. Holt (Utah 1949) 202 P. 
2nd 550; rehearing denied 115 Utah 73 at headnote 4: 
Supreme Court may review the facts as well 
as the law on appeal in child custody proceeding 
bet"\\reen divorced parents. U.C.A. 1943, 40-3-5. 
40-3-10, 
\Yill show the following facts : 
1. The minor child has lived continuously with its 
father for the past 20 months immediately preceding the 
initial action from which the appeal arises ( Divoret) 
decree, record pg. 1; Tr. 5-6-7; Tr. 23-24-25 ). The father 
has regular employment, earns $240.00 per tnonth and 
has been working for the same company for a period of 
seven years; he lives in a home in a desirable residential 
district in Salt Lake City, \vhich he is purcha~ing ~ tl~t· 
father for the 20 Inonths prior to the coinmencentent of 
the action from which this appeal arise~, Hpeut a ntunhl'l" 
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of hours w·ith the child each day; the father remarried 
having as a second ·wife a \Voman who professes great 
love for the child, has eared for the child and supervised 
its_upbringing for n1onths and has arranged a trust fund 
from the proceeds of her former husband's estate to pro-
vide the child 'vi th advanced eduea tion. The father, 
together with his present "rife, have made plans for the 
child's ·w·elfare and schooling, have acquired a domicile 
where the child can reside in security, attend o~1e system 
of schools and grow up in a proper residential neighbor-
hood. The child has been in· excellent health throughout 
the period of custody in the appellant, has had the con-
stant companionship of his father, has attended Sund-ay 
School and has become properly acclimated to his en-
vironment. 
On the other hand to weigh against the father's 
custody the evidence shows; that the defendant and 
respondent is the child's natural mother; that though 
she has visited the child regularly while in Salt Lake 
City, that she has been outside the State a portion of 
the time and has never had actual care, custody and 
control of the child since the day of entry of the divorce 
decree; that though under the divorce decree she \Vas 
entitled to the custody of the child on two different 
occasions she failed to assert her custody thereto, on the 
first occasion because she was 'vorking and couldn't 
properly eare for the child, but admitted on exa1nination 
that when her first period of custody arrived she was 
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on a trip to California (Tr. 33); on the date for her 
second period of custody to begin the mother '\as Inar-
ried again, able to, by her own testimony, provide a 
proper home for the child but arranged a trading of 
periods of custody as she was again going to California 
\Vi th her husband. 
The record also sho,vs by the testimony of the 
defendant and of her present husband, Mr. Trask, that 
they do not have ·perinanent or even semi-permanent 
place of abode; that Mr. Trask's employment requires 
two interstate moves per year, 'vi th both n1oves being 
during the norrnal school year. Defendant and her 
husband were living at the time of the initial action in 
the home of another person in San Diego, California, 
together with such other person and her two children 
ages seven and ten, with the defendant having the duties 
of caring for the house and the children while the other 
woman worked. The testimony of the defendant and her 
husband also show that they contemplate n1oving baek 
to Salt Lake City some time in May, but that they havP 
no arrangements for living quarters in Salt Lak~ City, 
nor have they made arrangements for bringing a ehild 
into the abode in San Diego, California. Mr. Trask 
indicates that he is willing to change occupation~ to n1ake 
a ho1ne for the child, but also contemplates eotning had\ 
to Salt Lake to take a job in the roofing indu~try. \\'hieh 
by his own ad1nission will require another tnove to a 
milder climate upon the onset of \\'inter. 
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The defendant is married for the third tin1e; the 
preYious t\vo n1arriages haYing ended in divorce. fler 
present husband testifies that he has an affection for the 
child and 'Yould like to have hirn in the home because 
(Tr. 41, line 24 et seq.) 
''Absolutely. My love for my wife, and I know 
her being a natural mother, and I think it is only 
right; I know I can always try to do my part to 
right; I know I can always try to do my part to 
be an affectionate person to see that the child has 
its wants in every way. I feel very much, affec-
tionate toward Gavyn. I like him very well. He is 
a nice little boy; like to see him with his mother if 
possible. ' ' 
Then Mr. Trask goes on to testify on cross exami-
nation, that he has a child of his own by a former marri-
age, a girl age ten years, that he does not assist to support 
and has not seen for several years and upon cross exam-
ination (Tr. page 58, line 21 et seq.) 
Question ... What attempts have you made 
to do everything in the world as you stated for 
your own child. 
Answer . . . Well, I can't answer that. 
In Sa1npsell v. I-1 olt, 115 Utah 73, denying a rehear-
ing of Sampsell v. Holt (202 P. 2nd 550) which v\·as a 
case of a father prevailing in getting partial custody of a 
son three years of age, after sole custody in the n1other 
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since the time of the divorce decree, sets out at headnotP 
3 thereof; 
Divorce. Child custody proceedings bet"~een 
divorced parents are equitable, and best interest 
and welfare of the minor child is the controlling 
factor. UCA 1943, 40-3-5, 40-3-10. 
The Court in the person of Justice Wolfe in discus-
sing the matter points out the legislative hi8tory of the 
two statutes and holding that 40-3-5 applies to situation~ 
involving a divorce and that 40- 3-10 is applicable to eaf-'e~ 
of separation and in differentiating there between goes 
on to point out that at 115 Utah 79, paragraph 3 
''In holding as we do, we do no violence to pre-
viously established concepts, even in those ea~l~s 
intimating or assuming that Sec. 40-3-10 \Yas 
applicable to divorce suits, it was held that UlHlPr 
such 
'statute, the paramount question ~till rPrnains 
what disposition of the custody of the ehild is 
for its best interest and welfare 1' Cooke v. 
Cooke, 67 Utah 371, 248 P. 83, 102. See also 
the recent case of Briggs v. Briggs 111 Utah 
418, 181 P. 2nd 223." 
The Court therein holding that custody 1nn~t h~· 
determined on the basis of the h<~st interest and \Vt\lfa r(~ 
of the child from all consideration~ and gi Yin .!."t' no lPgnl 
right in the n1other to custody of tl1e ehil<l a~ uncltlr l '.C .. \. 
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40-3-10 or even a preference to such custody. 
In the case at the bar, the record shovrs not one 
scintilla of evidence , sho·\Ying the best interests of the 
child to lie in custody by the mother other than the fact 
that the defendant is the natural n1other of the child. 
The Court in making its ruling in paragraph 7 of 
its Findings of Fact (Record 80) and in paragraph 
1. (a) of its Conclusions of Law ( Rec. 8) and again in 
paragraph 1. (a) of it's Order (Rec. 82) was not sup-
ported by the evidence as a whole; the Court therein 
allo".,ing the fact that the defendant was the natural 
mother of the child to outweigh all other facts concerning 
the interests and welfare of the child, to-wit: the estab-
lished home in which the child had been living, the per-
manent nature of such home, the probability ·of being 
enablea to attend one system of schools and make a circle 
of permanent acquaintances, the fact that the child had 
enjoyed the society, counsel and affection of his father 
through the past 20 months. We repeat that an exam- · 
ination of the record shows not one scintilla of evidence 
favoring custody in the mother other than her relation-
ship as natural mother. 
POINT NO. II 
THAT THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW ARE INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE DECREE. 
Plaintiff contends that the findings of fact and 
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conclusions of law set out by the Court (Rec. 79-81) are 
merely reiterations of the allegations of defendant~=' 
affidavit (Rec. 9-11) and defendants motion for nlodifi-
cation (Rec. 8), and as such fail to make a Finding of 
Facts supported by any evidence sufficient to support 
the decree based thereon. 
The material issues herein arise from the petitions 
of both parties herein and are as follows: 
1. Has there been a material change of circuiu-
stance since the date of the initial divorce decree. 
2. Is the split custody arrangement effected by the 
divorce decree in the best interests of tht> child 
under the prevailing circumstances. 
3. Is the best interest of the child to be pfft·etPll 
under the present circumstances by custody in 
the father (Plaintiff's Petition, Rec. 5 Para. 10). 
4. Is the best interest of the child to be ~erYPd hy 
granting under present circu1nstances custody to 
the mother (Defendant'~ Petition, R('('. 11, Pur:l. 
8). 
5. ''r ould allo\Ying thP ehild to be taken out of thP 
State by plaintiff to a strange and probahl~· tPnl-
porary donlicile be detrin1ental to thP h(lalth, 
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\velfare and best interest of the child (Plaintiff's 
Petition, Rec. 5, Para. 11) . 
.. A.ll of the above 1natters were put in issue by plain-
tiff's Order to Shov{ Cause (Rec. 6), and the stipulation 
of parties as to joint hearing. 
There is no question of fact as to items 1 and 2 
above, the parties being in agreement thereto. 
The Court makes an affirmative finding of facts as 
to item 4 above, but fails to find either affirmatively or 
negatively as to issue 3 above except by possible impli-
cation from the Court's affirmative finding on isf-;ue 
number 4 above. 
The findings of fact show no finding e~ther affirm-
ative or negative with regard to issue number 5. 
It is the contention of the appellant that the fa~lure 
of the findings to find either negatively or affirmatively 
on ultimate questions of fact raised and controverted by 
the pleadings makes said findings insufficient to support 
the decree under Rule 52a, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Citing with respect thereto: !XL Stores Co. vs. 
Moon, 49U262, 162 P. 622, 
''The findings should be on all Issues both af-
firmative and negative.'' 
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and from Doe vs. Doe, 48U200, 158 P. 781, 
"Under statute requiring specific and direct 
findings of ultimate facts on all material is~ues, 
and a separate statements of conclusions of la\r, 
until there are findings on all material issue~ 
raised by the pleadings, the findings are in~uf­
ficient to support the judgement.'' 
The plaintiff further contends that paragraphs 2, 3, 
4 and 5 of the findings of facts ( Rec. 79-80) are findings 
incidental to the ultimate issues and that said paragraphs 
and particularly paragraph 4 thereof are not supported 
by any evidence except affirmative statements of opinion 
by defendant and her husband, which are by then1selve~ 
rebutted by statements as to the insecure and transient 
nature of their present and future conternplated donli-
cile and are not ultimate facts based on the evidence. 
POINT NO. III 
THAT APPELLANT'S lv.IOTION FOR AMENDMENT OF 
FINDINGS OF FACTS SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED. 
The plaintiff's contention that the Court erred in 
denying plaintiff's motion for a1nendment of Finding:-; 
of Fact (Rec. 88) is based on the argun1ents prp~entt)d 
on points No. 1 and 2. 
POINT NO. IV 
THAT THE PROPER LAW TO BE APPLIED IN 
DETERMINING THE CASE AT HAND IS TITLE 80, SEC-
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TION 3-5 RATHER THAN TITLE 30, SECTION 3-10, U.C.A. 
1953, AND THAT THE EVIDENCE IN THE HEARING OF 
FEBRUARY 16, 1953, WILL NOT SUPPORT THE CON-
CLUSIONS AND FINDINGS OF THE COURT UNDER SAID 
LAW. 
The Supreme Court of Utah in the case of Samp~sell 
vs. I-I olt, 202 P. 550, and again in a denial of rehearing of 
that case at 115 Utah 73, fully differentiates the two 
statutes and holds at headnote 1 thereof: 
''Divorce. Statute giving mother absolute right 
to custody of child under ten years of age up.on 
separation of parents, unless established that 
she is an improper person, is intended to apply 
only in cases of separation, and upon divorce, 
the statute authorizing court to make such orders 
in relation to custody of children as may be equi-
table should be applied. U.C.A. 1943, 40-3-5, 
40-3-10.' '' 
and at head note 3 of the same case, 
''Divorce. Child custody proceedings between 
divorced parents are equitable, and best interest 
and welfare of the minor child is the controlling 
factor." · 
The Court discusses the legislative history, reconciles 
the two sections being under the same title and in so 
differentiating sets forth: 
115 Utah at page 79, para. 2: ''vVe are not un-
mindful that prior opinions of this Court have in-
timated that Section 40-3-10 'vas applicable to 
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divorce actions. In all probability, thac section 
is generally understood by the bench and bar of 
this state as being applicable to divorce suits. 
However, the question has never been squarely 
presented to this court before, and there has been 
no occasion heretofore for the court to analyzt) 
'vith great care the real problem. The result ha~ 
merely been assurnn1ed by both court and coun~el 
without careful consideration of these statutes, 
and "rithout exainination of the legislative history 
of the statutes.'' 
The above two statutes being the only law· applicable 
to the Court's povver to control and regulate the custody 
of minor children -vvithin our State, witl1 the .exception 
of statutes controlling juvenile court actions \vhich art· 
not here applicable, it is the contention of the appellant 
herein that 40-3-5 U.C.A. 1943, now 30-3-5 U.C.A. 1953, 
Inust ·be the law applied to the facts in the instant case 
as well as to Sampsell vs. Holt (supra) and under sueh 
law there being no legal right to custody in the mother 
of the minor, nor so much as a presumption under tla~ 
statute or the cases decided thereunder that the best 
interests and welfare of a minor child are served by 
custody in the maternal parent rather than the father. 
The instant case must be controlled by the best intt~restH 
of the minor determined from the facts produced upon 
the action for modification; and that ~aid e,~idencE·, 
by a clear preponderance as discussed in point one or 
this brief, shows the interests and welfare of thP 1ninor, 
Gavyn Varley Stnith, age 4, to hP under thP eontintu.k'l 
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eare and custody of the father in a permanent hon1e 
already established, under the cate and affection of th{~ 
father's present wife who has cared for the child as a 
mother for months past; rather than in the cust.ody of 
the defendant "'"hose entire case is based on a purported 
ability to provide a proper home and welfare for the child 
\'."ith no basis of fact shown by the evidence that defend-
ant is in a present position to provide the child v/ith a 
proper home or environment and has no concrete plans 
for the future, .but indicates a 'villingness to lay such 
plans for the future. In short, the facts show a present 
proper home environment for a minor child in the plain-
tiff's current situation with only a stated willingness 
and desire to establish such a home by the defendant and 
a necessity to change the "\vay of life and means of liveli-
hood of defendant's present spouse in order to estahlish 
an adequate environment for a minor child. 
The evidence herein when viewed under the statutory 
law applicable to this action cannot support either the 
Findings of Fact nor the Cl)nclusions of Law on which 
the decree by the District C~urt was based. 
CONCLUSION 
In summary we can only refer the Court again to the 
record which contains the whole of evidence herein and 
'vhich states the facts which in a case of this nature are 
revie,vable with the law and in doing so reiterate our 
eont~ntion that the evidence shows by a clear prepond-
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erance when. considered as a whole that only equitable 
dispensation of the custody of the nrinor child n1u~t b~ 
\vith that parent 'vho has established a pern1anent home 
for the child in ""\Yhich its security, continued affettion, 
normal environment and the possiblity of norn1al school-
]ng can be continued and assured without biyearly pull-
ing up of the child's roots and reestablishing the 1ninor 
in a different and unkno,vn evironment. 
vV e further contend that the same evidence, ·when 
construed in view of 30-3-5 U.C.A. 1953, which according 
to Sampsell vs. Holt is the law applicable herein and 
which contains no legal right or presu1nption of right 
to custody in either parent, is of such a nature that it 
cannot under any consideration support the Findings 
of Facts on which the decree herein is based, that the 
prime issue in the hearing on the merits was detenni-
na tion of the best interests of the child based upon a con-
sideration of all the material evidence and "·ithout th~ 
aid of a statutory right in the defendant or a presuinp-
tion of right in the defendant, the evidence of record doe:-' 
not and cannot support the Findings of F.,acts, the Con-
clusions of Law nor the decree herein. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SUMNER J. HATCI-l 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
and Appellant 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
